Watson described the purpose of psychology as:. Historically, the most significant distinction between versions of behaviorism is that between Watson's original 'methodological behaviorism,' and forms of behaviorism later inspired by his work, known collectively as neobehaviorism e. Watson's article 'Psychology as the behaviorist views it' is often referred to as the 'behaviorist manifesto,' in which Watson , p. The behaviorist, in his efforts to get a unitary scheme of animal response, recognizes no dividing line between man and brute. The behavior of man, with all of its refinement and complexity, forms only a part of the behaviorist's total scheme of investigation'.
Behaviorism - Learning Theories
Radical behaviorism was founded by B. F Skinner and agreed with the assumption of methodological behaviorism that the goal of psychology should be to predict and control behavior. Skinner, like Watson, also recognized the role of internal mental events, and while he agreed such private events could not be used to explain behavior, he proposed they should be explained in the analysis of behavior.
Another important distinction between methodological and radical behaviorism concerns the extent to which environmental factors influence behavior. Watson's methodological behaviorism asserts the mind is tabula rasa a blank slate at birth.
Behaviorist Learning Theory
In contrast, radical behaviorism accepts the view that organisms are born with innate behaviors, and thus recognizes the role of genes and biological components in behavior. An obvious advantage of behaviorism is its ability to define behavior clearly and to measure changes in behavior. According to the law of parsimony, the fewer assumptions a theory makes, the better and the more credible it is. Behaviorism, therefore, looks for simple explanations of human behavior from a very scientific standpoint. However, behaviorism only provides a partial account of human behavior, that which can be objectively viewed.
Important factors like emotions, expectations, higher-level motivation are not considered or explained. Accepting a behaviorist explanation could prevent further research from other perspective that could uncover important factors. In addition, humanism e. Humanistic psychology also assumes that humans have free will personal agency to make their own decisions in life and do not follow the deterministic laws of science.
This is known as an idiographic approach. Freud also rejects the idea that people are born a blank slate tabula rasa and states that people are born with instincts e. They emphasize the role of nature over nurture. For example, chromosomes and hormones testosterone influence our behavior too, in addition to the environment. Cognitive psychology states that mediational processes occur between stimulus and response, such as memory , thinking, problem-solving, etc. Despite these criticisms, behaviorism has made significant contributions to psychology.
These include insights into learning, language development, and moral and gender development, which have all been explained in terms of conditioning. It is distinct from other schools of behaviorism, with major differences in the acceptance of mediating structures, the role of emotions, etc. You must be logged in to post a comment. Useful Tools and Resources. Watson Ivan Pavlov B. Thorndike Albert Bandura Key Concepts Behaviorism is a worldview that assumes a learner is essentially passive, responding to environmental stimuli.
Radical behaviorism Developed by BF Skinner, Radical Behaviorism describes a particular school that emerged during the reign of behaviorism. Skinner countenances talk of inner events provided that they are treated in the same manner as public or overt responses. An adequate science of behavior, he claims, must describe events taking place within the skin of the organism as part of behavior itself see Skinner Skinner does not have much to say about just how inner or covert behavior like thinking, classifying, and analyzing can be described in the same manner as public or overt behavior.
But his idea seems roughly to be this. Just as we may describe overt behavior or motor movement in terms of concepts like stimulus, response, conditioning, reinforcement, and so on, so we may deploy the very same terms in describing inner or covert behavior. One thought may reinforce another thought. An act of analysis may serve as a stimulus for an effort at classification. Purely 'mentalistic' activities may be at least roughly parsed in terms of behavioral concepts — a topic to be revisited later in the entry in the 7th Section.
Skinner is the only major figure in the history of behaviorism to offer a socio-political world view based on his commitment to behaviorism. Skinner constructed a theory as well as narrative picture in Walden Two of what an ideal human society would be like if designed according to behaviorist principles see also Skinner Skinner's social worldview illustrates both his aversion to free will, to homunculi, to dualism as well as his reasons for claiming that a person's history of environmental interactions controls his or her behavior.
One remarkable feature of human behavior which Skinner deliberately rejects is that people creatively make their own environments see Chomsky , Black The world is as it is, in part, because we make it that way. Critics have raised several objections to the Skinnerian social picture. One of the most persuasive, and certainly one of the most frequent, adverts to Skinner's vision of the ideal human society. It is a question asked of the fictional founder of Walden Two, Frazier, by the philosopher Castle. It is the question of what is the best social mode of existence for a human being.
Frazier's, and therein Skinner's, response to this question is both too general and incomplete. However, these values are hardly the detailed basis of a social system. There is a notorious difficulty in social theory of specifying the appropriate level of detail at which a blueprint for a new and ideal society must be presented see Arnold , pp.
Skinner identifies the behavioristic principles and learning incentives that he hopes will reduce systematic injustices in social systems. He also describes a few practices concerning child rearing and the like that are intended to contribute to human happiness. However, he offers only the haziest descriptions of the daily lives of Walden Two citizens and no suggestions for how best to resolve disputes about alternative ways of life that are prima facie consistent with behaviorist principles see Kane , p.
He gives little or no serious attention to the crucial general problem of inter-personal conflict resolution and to the role of institutional arrangements in resolving conflicts. In an essay which appeared in The Behavior Analyst , nearly forty years after the publication of Walden Two, Skinner, in the guise of Frazier, tried to clarify his characterization of ideal human circumstances.
However, of course, doing a hundred things humans enjoy doing means only that Walden Two is vaguely defined, not that its culturally instituted habits and the character of its institutions merit emulation. The incompleteness of Skinner's description of the ideal human society or life is so widely acknowledged that one might wonder if actual experiments in Walden Two living could lend useful detail to his blueprint.
More than one such social experiment has been conducted. Perhaps the most interesting in part because the community has evolved away from its Skinnerian roots is the Twin Oaks Community in Virginia in the U. Behaviorism has lost strength and influence. It is dismissed by cognitive scientists developing intricate internal information processing models of cognition. Its laboratory routines are neglected by cognitive ethologists and ecological psychologists convinced that its methods are irrelevant to studying how animals and persons behave in their natural and social environment.
Types of Behaviorism
Its traditional relative indifference towards neuroscience and deference to environmental contingencies is rejected by neuroscientists sure that direct study of the brain is the only way to understand the truly proximate causes of behavior. But by no means has behaviorism disappeared. Robust elements of behaviorism survive in both behavior therapy and laboratory-based animal learning theory of which more below.
In the metaphysics of mind, too, behavioristic themes survive in the approach to mind known as functionalism. Functionalism defines states of mind as states that play particular causal-functional roles in animals or systems in which they occur. Paul Churchland writes of functionalism as follows: Why has the influence of behaviorism declined?
The deepest and most complex reason for behaviorism's decline in influence is its commitment to the thesis that behavior can be explained without reference to non-behavioral mental cognitive, representational, or interpretative activity. Neurophysiological and neurobiological conditions, for Skinner, sustain or implement these functional relations. But they do not serve as ultimate or independent sources of behavior. Skinner was no triumphalist about neuroscience. Therein, it rides evidential or epistemic piggyback on radical behaviorism's prior description of those interactions.
Neuroscience describes inside-the-box mechanisms that permit today's reinforcing stimulus to affect tomorrow's behavior. The neural box is not empty, but it is unable, except in cases of malfunction or breakdown, to disengage the animal from past patterns of behavior that have been reinforced. It cannot exercise independent or non-environmentally countervailing authority over behavior. For many critics of behaviorism it seems obvious that, at a minimum, the occurrence and character of behavior especially human behavior does not depend primarily upon an individual's reinforcement history, although that is a factor, but on the fact that the environment or learning history is represented by an individual and how the manner in which it is represented.
The fact that the environment is represented by me constrains or informs the functional relations that hold between my behavior and the environment and may, from an anti-behaviorist perspective, partially disengage my behavior from its conditioning or reinforcement history. No matter, for example, how tirelessly and repeatedly I have been reinforced for pointing to or eating ice cream, such a history is impotent if I just don't see a potential stimulus as ice cream or represent it to myself as ice cream or if I desire to hide the fact that something is ice cream from others.
My conditioning history, narrowly understood as unrepresented by me, is behaviorally less important than the environment or my learning history as represented or interpreted by me. Similarly, for many critics of behaviorism, if representationality comes between environment and behavior, this implies that Skinner is too restrictive or limited in his attitude towards the role of brain mechanisms in producing or controlling behavior. The central nervous system, which otherwise sustains my reinforcement history, contains systems or neurocomputational sub-systems that implement or encode whatever representational content the environment has for me.
It is also an active interpretation machine or semantic engine, often critically performing environmentally untethered and behavior controlling tasks. Such talk of representation or interpretation, however, is a perspective from which behaviorism—most certainly in Skinner—wished to depart. One defining aspiration of traditional behaviorism is that it tried to free psychology from having to theorize about how animals and persons represent internally, in the head their environment.
Unfortunately, for behaviorism, it's hard to imagine a more restrictive rule for psychology than one which prohibits hypotheses about representational storage and processing. See also Graham , pp. On the scope of the phenomenal in human mentality, see Graham, Horgan, and Tienson Place, although otherwise sympathetic to the application of behaviorist ideas to matters of mind, argued that phenomenal qualia cannot be analyzed in behaviorist terms.
He claimed that qualia are neither behavior nor dispositions to behave. They are instantaneous features of processes or events rather than dispositions manifested over time. Qualitative mental events such as sensations, perceptual experiences, and so on , for Place, undergird dispositions to behave rather than count as dispositions. Indeed, it is tempting to postulate that the qualitative aspects of mentality affect non-qualitative elements of internal processing, and that they, for example, contribute to arousal, attention, and receptivity to associative conditioning.
The third reason for rejecting behaviorism is connected with Noam Chomsky. Chomsky has been one of behaviorism's most successful and damaging critics. By the age of four or five normal children have an almost limitless capacity to understand and produce sentences which they have never heard before.
- Peabody (Paybody. Pabody, Pabodie) genealogy.
- Behaviorist Approach!
- An encyclopedia of philosophy articles written by professional philosophers.?
Chomsky also argued that it seems plainly untrue that language learning depends on the application of reinforcement. Language as such seems to be learned without, in a sense, being explicitly taught or taught in detail, and behaviorism doesn't offer an account of how this could be so. Chomsky's own speculations about the psychological realities underlying language development include the hypothesis that the rules or principles underlying linguistic behavior are abstract applying to all human languages and innate part of our native psychological endowment as human beings.
When put to the test of uttering a grammatical sentence, a person, for Chomsky, has a virtually infinite number of possible responses available, and the only way in which to understand this virtually infinite generative capacity is to suppose that a person possesses a powerful and abstract innate grammar underlying whatever competence he or she may have in one or more particular natural languages.
The problem to which Chomsky refers, which is the problem of behavioral competence and thus performance outstripping individual learning histories, goes beyond merely the issue of linguistic behavior in young children. It appears to be a fundamental fact about human beings that our behavior and behavioral capacities often surpass the limitations of individual reinforcement histories.
Our history of reinforcement is often too impoverished to determine uniquely what we do or how we do it. Much learning, therefore, seems to require pre-existing or innate representational structures or principled constraints within which learning occurs. See also Brewer , but compare with Bates et al. Is the case against behaviorism definitive?
Paul Meehl noted decades ago that theories in psychology seem to disappear not under the force of decisive refutation but rather because researchers lose interest in their theoretical orientations Meehl What may this mean for behaviorism? It may mean that some version of the doctrine might rebound. But this does not mean that behaviorism cannot gain useful alliance with neuroscience. Reference to brain structures neurobiology, neurochemistry, and so on may help in explaining behavior even if such references do not ultimately displace reference to environmental contingencies in a behaviorist account.
Such is a lesson of animal modeling in which behaviorist themes still enjoy currency.
Animal models of addiction, habit and instrumental learning are particularly noteworthy because they bring behavioral research into closer contact than did traditional psychological behaviorism with research on the brain mechanisms underlying reinforcement, especially positive reinforcement West , pp. One result of this contact is the discovery that sensitized neural systems responsible for heightened reinforcement value or strength can be dissociated from the hedonic utility or pleasurable quality of reinforcement see Robinson and Berridge The power of a stimulus to reinforce behavior may be independent of whether it is a source or cause of pleasure.
Focus on brain mechanisms underlying reinforcement also forms the centerpiece of one of the most active research programs in current neuroscience, so-called neuroeconomics, which weds study of the brain's reward systems with models of valuation and economic decision making see Montague and Berns ; Nestler and Malenka ; Ross et al Behaviorism may do well to purchase some of neuroeconomic's conceptual currency, especially since some advocates of the program see themselves as behaviorists in spirit if not stereotypical letter and honor the work of a number of theorists in the behavioristic tradition of the experimental analysis of behavior, such as George Ainslie, Richard Herrnstein and Howard Rachlin, on how patterns of behavior relate to patterns of reward or reinforcement see Ross et al.
Other potential sources of renewal? The continued popularity of behavior therapy is noteworthy because it offers a potential domain of testing application for the regimen of behaviorism. Early versions of behavior therapy sought to apply restricted results from Skinnerian or Pavlovian conditioning paradigms to human behavior problems. No minds should be spoken of; just behavior—stimuli, responses, and reinforcement. Therapy shapes behavior not thought. Successive generations of behavior therapy have relaxed those conceptual restrictions.
Advocates refer to themselves as cognitive behavior therapists e. Mahoney, ; Meichenbaum, Clients' behavior problems are described by referring to their beliefs, desires, intentions, memories, and so on. One goal of such language is to encourage clients to monitor and self-reinforce their own behavior. Self-reinforcement is an essential feature of behavioral self-control Rachlin ; Ainslie It may be wondered whether cognitive behavior therapy is consistent with behaviorist doctrine.
Much depends on how beliefs and desires are understood. It would reflect the principle of logical or analytical behaviorism that if mental terms are to be used in the description and explanation of behavior, they must be defined or paraphrased in non-mental behavioral terms. But the topic of the forms and limits of behavior therapy and the range of its plausible application is open for continued further exploration. Hempel had come to believe that it is a mistake to imagine that human behavior can be understood exclusively in non-mental, behavioristic terms.
Contemporary psychology and philosophy largely share Hempel's conviction that the explanation of behavior cannot omit invoking a creature's representation of its world. Psychology must use psychological terms. Behavior without cognition is blind. Psychological theorizing without reference to internal cognitive processing is explanatorily impaired.
To say this, of course, is not to a priori preclude that behaviorism will recover some of its prominence. Just how to conceive of cognitive processing even where to locate it remains a heated subject of debate see Melser ; see also Levy , pp. But if behaviorism is to recover some of its prominence, this recovery may require a reformulation of its doctrines that is attune to developments like that of neuroeconomics in neuroscience as well as in novel therapeutic orientations.
But we don't just run and mate and walk and eat. We think, classify, analyze, and theorize. In addition to our outer behavior, we have highly complex inner lives, wherein we are active, often imaginatively, in our heads, all the while often remaining as stuck as posts, as still as stones.
Call this 'inner behavior' if one wants, but this piece of linguistic stipulation does not mean that the probability or occurrence of inner events is shaped by the same environmental contingencies as overt behavior or bodily movements.
It does not mean that understanding a sentence is the same general sort of discriminatory response as learning how to move one's body in pursuit of a goal.