PDF What will it be, an elite global union, or an islamic global caliphate?

Free download. Book file PDF easily for everyone and every device. You can download and read online What will it be, an elite global union, or an islamic global caliphate? file PDF Book only if you are registered here. And also you can download or read online all Book PDF file that related with What will it be, an elite global union, or an islamic global caliphate? book. Happy reading What will it be, an elite global union, or an islamic global caliphate? Bookeveryone. Download file Free Book PDF What will it be, an elite global union, or an islamic global caliphate? at Complete PDF Library. This Book have some digital formats such us :paperbook, ebook, kindle, epub, fb2 and another formats. Here is The CompletePDF Book Library. It's free to register here to get Book file PDF What will it be, an elite global union, or an islamic global caliphate? Pocket Guide.

Sufism could also be condemned as a source of degeneracy. Within an Islamic context this type of movement was not conservative , because it sought not to conserve what had been passed down but to renew what had been abandoned. Although the first state produced by this alliance did not last, it laid the foundations for the existing Saudi state in Arabia and inspired similar activism elsewhere down to the present day. In West Africa a series of activist movements appeared from the 18th century into the 19th.

There, as in Arabia, Islamic activism was directed less at non-Muslims than at Muslims who had gone astray. Such Muslims were inspired by reformist scholars from numerous times and places—e. Jihad activity continued for a century; it again became millennial near the turn of the next Muslim century, in ah ce , as the need to resist European occupation became more urgent. In the Indian Ocean area Islamic activism was more often intellectual and educational. During his lifetime the collapse of Muslim political power was painfully evident.

Once again the study of Hadith provided a rich array of precedents and inspired a positive spirit of social reconstruction akin to that of the Prophet Muhammad. The many efforts to revive and resist were largely unsuccessful. By British hegemony over India was complete, and many other colonies and mandates followed between then and the aftermath of World War I. Not all Muslim territories were colonized, but nearly all experienced some kind of dependency, be it psychological, political, technological, cultural, or economic.

Perhaps only the Saudi regime in the central parts of the Arabian Peninsula could be said to have escaped any kind of dependency, but even there oil exploration, begun in the s, brought European interference. In the 19th century Westernization and Islamic activism coexisted and competed. By the turn of the 20th century secular ethnic nationalism had become the most common mode of protest in Islamdom, but the spirit of Islamic reconstruction was also kept alive, either in conjunction with secular nationalism or in opposition to it.

In the 19th-century Ottoman Empire, selective Westernization coexisted with a reconsideration of Islam. The program of reform known as the Tanzimat , which was in effect from to , aimed to emulate European law and administration by giving all Ottoman subjects, regardless of religious confession, equal legal standing and by limiting the powers of the monarch.

Islam and Politics: Crash Course World History 216

In the s a group known as the Young Ottomans tried to identify the basic principles of European liberalism—and even love of nation—with Islam itself. Islamic protest often took the form of jihads against Europeans: Underlying much of this activity was a Pan-Islamic sentiment that drew on very old conceptions of the ummah Muslim community as the ultimate solidarity group for Muslims.

All warned against the blind pursuit of Westernization, arguing that blame for the weaknesses of Muslims lay not with Islam but rather with Muslims themselves, because they had lost touch with the progressive spirit of social, moral, and intellectual reconstruction that had made early Islamicate civilization one of the greatest in human history. He further argued that Western technology could advance Muslims only if they retained and cultivated their own spiritual and cultural heritage.

This aggressive recovery of the past became a permanent theme of Islamic reconstruction. The Young Turk Revolution of was followed by a period in which similarly complex views of national identity were discussed in the Ottoman Empire. The tension between Islamic and national identification remained crucial for Muslims at the start of the 20th century. In countries under Western colonial rule, the struggle for national independence often went hand in hand with an effort by reformist intellectuals to recover what they thought was the authentic message of the original Muslim community.

Between the two World Wars, two distinct interpretations of Islam emerged from the Salafiyyah movement. One interpretation, drawing upon Pan-Islamism, politicized Islam by taking its scriptures to be the proper foundation of the social and political order. He insisted, moreover, that such a renovation entailed the implementation of Islamic precepts in social and political life. The Brotherhood later influenced other militant Islamic groups. The caliphate was merely a political construction and not an essential aspect of Islam.

Its disappearance with the end of the Ottoman Empire , therefore, was not a matter of concern. Henceforward, each predominantly Muslim country would be free to determine its own political system. The question of whether Islam should be the foundation of a national culture and politics dominated political discourse in Islamic countries throughout the 20th century and beyond. In particular, the political interpretation of Islam emerged alongside resistance to Western acculturation. Between the two World Wars, these scholars established several Islamic private schools offering Arabic-language instruction for boys and girls.

Islamic intellectuals and movements often put their educational endeavours at the centre of their projects to bring Islam into agreement with their times. Thus, the question of the transmission of Islamic knowledge versus secular and Westernized education became crucial.

Political aspects of Islam

Many Islamic thinkers viewed the two systems of education as compatible, arguing that they should be integrated and could complement each other. The Indonesian Nahdatul Ulama, for instance, favoured a system of Islamic schooling along modernized lines that would integrate religious and secular knowledge. Later in the 20th century, colonized Muslim societies except Palestine gradually achieved political independence and built new states. Two states, though established in societies that had not been colonized, exemplified contrasting paradigms.

This brand of secularist government also controlled the public expression of Islam and did not separate state and religion.

Caliphate - Wikipedia

In Egypt , which became a constitutional monarchy after though it was under colonial control until , the question of the relation between state and Islam generated fierce political controversies between secularists and those who interpreted Islam as a system of government. Among the latter, the Muslim Brotherhood grew from a grassroots organization into a mass movement that provided key popular support for the Revolution of the Free Officers, a military coup led by Col.

Gamal Abdel Nasser that ousted the monarchy. Similar movements in Palestine, Syria , Jordan , and North Africa , the politicized heirs of earlier reformist intellectual trends, later emerged as significant actors in their respective political scenes. Egypt, which had been under the influence of the Soviet Union since the mids, withdrew from military and other treaties with the Soviets in the s under Pres.

A new alliance between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, fostered by economic assistance to Egypt from Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing Persian Gulf states, altered the geopolitical map of Islam and led to new religious dynamics. In the Saudi regime established the Muslim World League in Mecca with the participation of Muslim scholars and intellectuals from all over the world.

The league, whose mission was to unify Muslims and promote the spread of Islam, opened offices in the Islamic world in the s and in the West in subsequent decades. With financial assistance as well as religious guidance from the league, new Islamic organizations were created by revivalist movements in the Islamic world and by immigrant Muslim communities in Europe and America. These movements were diverse from the start and did not reach public prominence until , when an Islamic state was founded in Iran through revolution.

The Iranian Revolution gave hope to many Islamist movements with similar programs by demonstrating the potential of Islam as a foundation for political mobilization and resistance. It further provided them with a blueprint for political action against governments that they believed had betrayed authentic Islam and grown corrupt and authoritarian.

The Islamic republic of Iran also competed with Saudi Arabia at the international level for influence in the Middle East. Even before the Iranian Revolution, however, offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood were radicalizing political Islam in other parts of the Islamic world.

The Islamic Assembly was reconfigured after the partition of Pakistan and India in in order to support the establishment of an Islamic state in Pakistan. This trend was also present in North Africa and South Asia. In many cases these activists were violently repressed. In some instances conflicts with government authorities led to bloody civil wars, as in Algeria between and , or to protracted armed struggles between military forces and Islamist groups, as in Egypt from the s to the mids. This repression resulted in the exile of many Islamist activists to Europe and the Americas and led many others to join such military fronts as the Afghan Jihad.

From the late s, Islamist groups were the object of sustained worldwide media attention. Yet nonviolent groups received significantly less attention than the few groups that advocated the use of violence. Nonviolent Islamists often expressed their willingness to participate in legal electoral politics.

This became possible in the s, when authoritarian regimes—faced with serious socioeconomic crises and seeking to legitimize themselves in the eyes of the public—implemented policies of limited political liberalization. The Muslim Brotherhood first engaged in electoral politics in Egypt in the s and in Jordan as early as In Morocco the Party of Justice and Development elected its first parliamentary representatives in In Indonesia the Prosperous Justice Party took part in legislative elections in Turkey allowed Islamists not only to participate in elections but also to govern at the national level.

In all these cases, mainstream opposition Islamist movements demonstrated their power to mobilize voters, a consequence of their social and charitable activism, their programs of good governance, and their fight against government corruption. Despite their tendencies to speak about the universality of the Muslim community, mainstream Islamists remained nationalistic.

Holding a conservative view of politics, they abandoned the revolutionary and utopian aspects of radical activism and instead struggled to moralize public and political life—e. Laws inspired by the Islamic legal tradition were implemented, however, in various forms in Iran after the revolution and in northern Sudan after In countries that did not practice electoral politics, movements of opposition devised other means of protest and participation. Contemporary Islamist movements are polarized between two main trends. On the one hand, most movements are mainstream and pragmatic, seeking eventually to govern through participation in the political system and public debate.

On the other hand, more-radical opposition groups reject electoral politics and seek revolutionary change, sometimes violently. Beginning in the last decade of the 20th century, some groups disconnected themselves from national politics in order to join transnational movements. Various scholars have argued that Islamist movements emerged in reaction to the failure of state-led modernization projects and to general socioeconomic problems such as youth unemployment and poverty.

Yet Islamist movements are not limited to poor countries or to disadvantaged, marginalized groups. In fact, members of these movements are generally highly educated, predominantly in secular fields, as a result of state-led modernization projects. In particular, mainstream Islamist parties are typically led by young men and women who are successful professionals with college or university degrees. As their Arab or national self-identifications break down, according to this view, people living in those countries turn to Islamism as a replacement. This is a misconception for two reasons.

First, earlier forms of nationalism in Islamic countries were not devoid of religious ideas. Second, state institutions in those countries regulated and influenced the legal and public manifestations of Islam, in particular through their systems of public education. In addition to becoming politicized in the hands of opposition movements and governments in the second half of the 20th century, Islam also followed a dynamic of revival that was deeply linked to sweeping educational, demographic , and social transformations.

A young generation came of age in the s, a time of rural exodus and urbanization, without having experienced colonial times. General access to education and the availability of printed Islamic literature also gave these young people an opportunity to build their own interpretations of Islam. Technological innovations allowed some Islamic preachers to be heard or read, and even to develop followings, across the world.

In the s both the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Egyptian preacher Sheikh Kishk disseminated their speeches and sermons on audiocassettes. In the s such new media as satellite television and the Internet began to offer faster means of access to ideas about Islam.

Through his Web site he disseminated advice on understanding and living Islam as a general ethics and on specific disciplines for achieving success and happiness in this world and in the afterlife. Social change in the Islamic world also encouraged Muslims to reevaluate gender relations. The Christian Reconquista Reconquest of Spain was already under way, having scored its first great victory at Toledo in Ironically, modern historiography has concentrated on the Crusades that failed and virtually ignored the ones that succeeded.

In the four centuries between the fall of Toledo and the fall of Granada , Spanish Christians replaced Muslim rulers throughout the Iberian Peninsula , although Muslims remained as a minority under Christian rule until the early 17th century. In the years from the fall of Jerusalem to the end of the Eighth Crusade , western European Crusaders failed to halt the Turkish advance or to establish a permanent presence in the Holy Land.

By local Muslims had managed to retake Jerusalem and thereby contain Christian ambitions permanently. By the time of the Fourth Crusade —04 the Crusading movement had been turned inward against Christian heretics such as the Byzantines. The direct impact of the Crusades on Islamdom was limited largely to Syria. For the century during which western European Christians were a serious presence there, they were confined to their massive coastal fortifications.

Slavery in Islam

The Crusaders had arrived in Syria at one of its most factionalized periods prior to the 20th century. The Crusaders soon found it difficult to operate as more than just another faction. Yet the significance of the Crusaders as a force against which to be rallied should not be underestimated any more than should the significance of Islamdom as a force against which Christendom could unite. They needed the food, supplies, and services available in the Muslim towns. Because warfare was seasonal and occasional, they spent much of their time in peaceful interaction with their non-Christian counterparts.

Some early-generation Crusaders intermarried with Arab Muslims or Arab Christians and adopted their personal habits and tastes, much to the dismay of Christian latecomers. Born in Syria, he was a small boy when the first generation of Franks controlled Jerusalem.

Migration and renewal (1041–1405)

Although the Franks in Syria were clearly influenced by the Muslims, the Crusades seem to have contributed relatively little to the overall impact of Islamicate culture on Europe , even though they constituted the most prolonged direct contact. This he used to draw together urban and military support for a jihad against the Christians. After taking Damascus , he established a second base in Egypt. That state became strong enough in its first decade to do what no other Muslim power could: The Mongols were pagan, horse-riding tribes of the northeastern steppes of Central Asia.

In the early 13th century, under the leadership of Genghis Khan, they formed, led, and gave their name to a confederation of Turkic tribes that they channeled into a movement of global expansion, spreading east into China , north into Russia, and west into Islamdom.

BBC News Navigation

Like other migratory peoples before them, Arabs, Imazighen, and Turks, they had come to be involved in citied life through their role in the caravan trade. Unlike others, however, they did not convert to Islam before their arrival. Furthermore, they brought a greater hostility to sedentary civilization, a more ferocious military force, a more cumbersome material culture , a more complicated and hierarchical social structure, and a more coherent sense of tribal law.

Their initial impact was physically more destructive than that of previous invaders, and their long-term impact perhaps more socially and politically creative. The Mongol regimes in Islamdom quickly became rivals. The Il-Khans ruled in the territories where Islam was most firmly established. They patronized learning of all types and scholars from all parts of the vast Mongol empire , especially China. Just as enthusiastically as they had destroyed citied life, they now rebuilt it, relying as had all previous invaders of Iran on the administrative skills of indigenous Persian-speaking bureaucrats.

It has been called the military patronage state because it involved a reciprocal relationship between the foreign tribal military conquerors and their subjects. The entire state was defined as a single mobile military force connected to the household of the monarch; with no fixed capital, it moved with the monarch. The leading tribal families could dispose of the wealth of the conquered populations as they wished, except that their natural superiority obligated them to reciprocate by patronizing whatever of excellence the cities could produce.

What the Ghaznavids and Seljuqs had begun, the Mongols now accomplished. The Mongols, like other Islamicate dynasties swept into power by a tribal confederation, were able to unify their domains for only a few generations. By the s their rule had begun to be fragmented among myriad local leaders. Meanwhile, on both Mongol flanks, other Turkic Muslim powers were increasing in strength. Muslim Delhi was a culturally lively place that attracted a variety of unusual persons.

In India, Sufism, which inherently undermined communalism, was bringing members of different religious communities together in ways very rare in the more westerly parts of Islamdom. Its sultans were chosen on a nonhereditary basis from among a group of freed slaves who acted as the leaders of the various slave corps. At the death of one sultan, the various military corps would compete to see whose leader would become the next sultan.

The leaders of the various slave corps formed an oligarchy that exercised control over the sultan. Although political instability was the frequent and natural result of such a system, cultural florescence did occur. They continued to cultivate the Islamicate arts, architecture in particular. The successive waves of Turkic migrations had driven unrelated individuals and groups across central Islamdom into Anatolia.

Avoiding the Konya state, they gravitated toward an open frontier to the west, where they began to constitute themselves, often through fictitious kinship relationships, into quasi-tribal states that depended on raiding each other and Byzantine territory and shipping. In the mids they won the town of Bursa and made it their first capital.

From Anatolia they crossed over into Thrace in the service of rival factions at Constantinople, then began to occupy Byzantine territory, establishing their second capital at Edirne on the European side. Their sense of legitimacy was complex. Finally they claimed descent from the leading Oghuz Turk families, who were natural rulers over sedentary populations. Under Murad I ruled c. Expanding first through western Anatolia and Thrace, the Ottomans under Bayezid I ruled — turned their eyes toward eastern and southern Anatolia; just as they had incorporated the whole, they encountered a neo-Mongol conqueror expanding into Anatolia from the east who utterly defeated their entire army in a single campaign Timur Tamerlane was a Turk, not a Mongol, but he aimed to restore Mongol power.

He planned to restore Mongol supremacy under a thoroughly Islamic program. He surpassed the Mongols in terror, constructing towers out of the heads of his victims.

Precolonial reform and experimentation from 1683 to 1818

His impact was twofold: These later empires managed to find the combination of Turkic and Islamic legitimacy that could produce the stable centralized absolutism that had eluded all previous Turkic conquerors. When the Arab conquerors arrived in the Maghrib in the 7th century, the indigenous peoples they met were the Imazighen Berbers; singular Amazigh , a group of predominantly but not entirely migratory tribes who spoke a recognizably common Afro-Asiatic language with significant dialectal variations.

Amazigh tribes could be found from present-day Morocco to present-day Algeria and from the Mediterranean to the Sahara. As among the Arabs, small tribal groupings of Imazighen occasionally formed short-lived confederations or became involved in caravan trade. No previous conqueror had tried to assimilate the Imazighen, but the Arabs quickly converted them and enlisted their aid in further conquests. Without their help, for example, Andalusia could never have been incorporated into the Islamicate state. At first only Imazighen nearer the coast were involved, but by the 11th century Muslim affiliation had begun to spread far into the Sahara.

By the 11th century their power in the western Sahara was being threatened by expansion both from other Amazigh tribes, centred at Sijilmassa, and from the Soninke state at Ghana to the south, which had actually captured their capital of Audaghost in For the Maghribi pilgrim, the cultural impact of the hajj was experienced not only in Mecca and Medina but also on the many stops along the 3,mile overland route. By all Muslim states in Andalusia had come under Almoravid control.

He also based his authority on the claim to bring correct Islam to peoples who had strayed from it. This was an approach to Islam far more current than the one it had replaced but still out of touch with the liveliest intellectual developments. During the next phase of Amazigh activism, newer trends from the east reached the Maghrib.

His activities aroused hostility, and he fled to the safety of his own people. There, like Muhammad, he grew from teacher of a personal following to leader of a social movement. He preached the idea of surrender to God to a people who had strayed from it. They even failed to maintain proper Muslim behaviour, be it the veiling of women in public or the condemning of the use of wine, musical instruments, and other unacceptable, if not strictly illegal, forms of pleasure.

In Andalusia their arrival slowed the progress of the Christian Reconquista. During the late Almohad period in Andalusia the intercommunal nature of Islamicate civilization became especially noticeable in the work of non-Muslim thinkers, such as Moses Maimonides , who participated in trends outside their own communities even at the expense of criticism from within. By the early 13th century, Almohad power began to decline; a defeat in at Las Navas de Tolosa by the Christian kings of the north forced a retreat to the Maghrib.

But the impact of Almohad cultural patronage on Andalusia long outlasted Almohad political power; successor dynasties in surviving Muslim states were responsible for some of the highest cultural achievements of Andalusian Muslims, among them the Alhambra palace in Granada. Furthermore, the year southward movement of the Christian-Muslim frontier resulted, ironically, in some of the most intense Christian-Muslim interaction in Andalusian history.

The Cid could fight for both sides; Muslims, as Mudejars, could live under Christian rule and contribute to its culture; Jews could translate Arabic and Hebrew texts into Castilian. There too, however, Almohad influence outlasted their political presence: As the Maghrib became firmly and distinctively Muslim, Islam moved south. The spread of Muslim identity into the Sahara and the involvement of Muslim peoples, especially the Tuareg, in trans-Saharan trade provided several natural channels of influence.